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Dividend Reductions and Signaling in an Imputation Environment 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In contrast to the double taxation system prevailing in the U.S., Australian firms operate within 
an imputation tax environment with respect to dividend payments.  We argue that the dividend 
imputation tax system increases the signaling potential of dividend reductions and our empirical 
findings strongly support this view. We find that the size of the dividend reduction is related to 
the tax credit status of the dividend.   Abnormal changes in profitability are negative in the year 
following dividend reductions and are negatively related to the dividend reduction; similar 
signaling effects are found in terms of price reactions.  Overall, our study conclusively 
demonstrates that dividend reductions in Australia have strong signaling power and, as such, our 
results are at variance with the results obtained in the U.S.    
 
Keywords:  Price reaction, Australia, Dividend Reductions, Signaling, Franked and 
Unfranked, Interim and Final.     
JEL classification: G14, G35  
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Dividend Reductions and Signaling in an Imputation Environment 
 
 
 
One of the foremost issues in corporate finance is the dividend signaling hypothesis.  
Despite the plethora of research in the U.S. the jury is still out as to whether changes in dividend 
policy convey credible signals regarding the future prospects of the firm. Although theoretical 
studies (Bhattacharya 1979, John and Williams 1985, Miller and Rock 1985) imply that dividend 
changes signal future prospects, several studies (Penman 1983, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner 1996, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 1997, Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler 
2005) fail to empirically support the proposition.  We argue that there are two major reasons 
behind the absence of widespread support for the signaling hypothesis in the U.S.  First, there 
has been a decreasing propensity of U.S. firms to pay dividends (Fama and French 2001).  In 
fact, the fraction of dividend payers falls steadily from 42% in 1980–1989 to 28% in 1995–2004 
(Skinner 2008).  We would argue that if most firms do not pay dividends then we cannot 
necessarily expect dividend changes to convey effective signals of firm value to investors.  
Second, managers could be driven by other factors besides future earnings in determining the 
level of dividends. These could be tax efficiency, financing new projects, and shoring up the 
financial position of the firm. In the U.S., since dividends are subject to double taxation, 
dividend distributions are sub-optimal from a tax perspective. 
A pertinent question in this regard is whether signaling through dividend changes would 
function well in an environment where paying dividends is much more prevalent. Additionally, it 
would be interesting to examine whether signaling would be more effective if the optimal tax-
induced policy favored dividends as compared to other forms of distribution to shareholders.  We 
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argue that the imputation tax system in Australia can provide new and important insights into the 
dividend signaling phenomenon and, in particular, the articulation between dividend signals and 
earnings.   
Our research is motivated by two major differences in the Australian setting regarding the 
payment of dividends as compared to the U.S. The first major difference pertains to the taxation 
of dividends in the hands of shareholders that we elaborate below while the second difference 
relates to the payment frequency. In contrast to the double taxation system prevailing in the U.S., 
Australian firms follow the imputation system with respect to dividend payments. A dividend 
imputation tax system effectively reduces or eliminates the double taxation of dividends.  Under 
the Australian system, companies provide resident shareholders with a credit for corporate tax 
paid that can be used to offset personal tax on dividend income.1 The dividends paid out of 
companies’ after tax profits (when tax is paid in Australia) carry imputation credits, and are 
referred to as franked dividends.  Profits that are earned and taxed outside Australia cannot be 
paid out to investors as franked dividends. Any dividends arising from the profits earned outside 
Australia will be unfranked and therefore subject to tax at the shareholders’ marginal income tax 
rate. Thus a major difference between the U.S. and Australian system is that, in Australia, 
franked dividends do not suffer from a tax disadvantage as compared to other forms of 
distribution such as stock repurchases.   
The effect of the dividend imputation system is to make the payment of cash dividends 
much more prevalent than in countries that follow the double-taxation system with respect to the 
payment of dividends.  Pattenden and Twite (2008) use the introduction of dividend imputation 
in Australia in 1987 as a natural experiment for testing the managerial responses to the 
                                                 
1 A description of the Australian dividend imputation tax system can be found in, for example, Cannavan, Finn and 
Gray (2004).   
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alternative tax systems.  They find that gross and net dividend payout ratios and dividend 
initiations increased subsequent to the introduction of the imputation system.    Furthermore, a 
dividend reduction in a system that favors dividend payments will have increased signaling 
potential and this implication could be exploited by empirically testing the relative signaling 
effects of franked and unfranked dividends. 
There are three major consequences of the imputation system.  Firstly, firms will prefer to 
issue equity as compared to debt, ceteris paribus, since investors can receive imputation credits 
with dividends but not with interest income.2  Secondly, investors would prefer a dollar of 
dividend income to a dollar of capital gains because of the imputation credits.  In such a 
scenario, a dividend reduction would be anticipated to have a greater importance.  In particular, 
managers will be reluctant to reduce franked dividends due to their tax efficiency, with the 
consequence that reductions in franked dividends would have stronger signaling potential than 
unfranked dividend reductions.  Thirdly, via the recovery of the tax credit against corporate 
taxable profits, the articulation between dividends and earnings is reinforced.  We argue that 
these features of the imputation system strengthen the signaling efficacy of dividends.  That is, 
the signaling power of a reduction in dividends will be stronger since this constitutes a cut 
relative to the tax preferred situation and management will be even more reluctant to reduce 
dividends in such a scenario. Therefore, dividend reductions in an imputation environment 
constitute strong signals regarding the future profitability of the firm as managers reduce not 
only the dividends but also the imputation benefit to shareholders.  The power of our study is 
enhanced by testing propositions in terms of the franking status of the dividends.  Such a testing 
structure will, then, provide direct evidence as to the tax effects upon signaling. 
                                                 
2 Twite (2001) argues that companies should optimally issue more equity and less debt under the imputation system.   
See also DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Fung and Theobald (1984) for a theoretical analysis of the dividend vs. 
debt and capital gains decisions across differing tax systems. 
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We therefore re-examine the signaling motive as the basis of dividend reductions in the 
Australian context.  Given the reluctance of managers to reduce dividends under the imputation 
environment, the act of reducing or omitting dividends arguably constitutes a bigger surprise 
than a dividend initiation or resumption.3 Although, a subset of papers (Healy and Palepu 1985, 
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995, and Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout 2008) has explicitly 
addressed the validity of the signaling hypothesis by studying dividend reductions in the US, we 
are not aware of any published study that examines the signaling implications of dividend 
reductions in Australia.  Furthermore, a study of dividend reductions will be timely in that the 
current financial crisis has already led to announcements of a number of dividend reductions. 
The other major difference between the U.S. and Australian system pertaining to 
dividends concerns the payment frequency.   In the U.S., dividends are paid on a quarterly basis, 
the amount of dividend paid each quarter being more or less equal.  In Australia, most firms pay 
dividends twice a year, the two payments being termed as interim and final dividends. Interim 
dividends are declared and paid prior to the availability of the annual accounting results.  Final 
dividends are announced and paid after the firm has finalised its annual accounts.  Clearly the 
quantum of information available to investors prior to the payment of final dividend is higher as 
compared to the time when interim dividends are paid. Another important difference between 
interim and final dividend payments is the relative amounts paid: interim dividend payments are 
typically much smaller than final dividends.  
We expect to find stronger evidence regarding the signaling motive in Australia due to 
the full imputation environment. We find that dividend reductions are associated with negative 
stock price reactions and that the magnitude of price reaction varies directly with the size of 
                                                 
3 Jensen and Johnson (1995, p 33) argue that dividend reduction in a stable dividend payment firm is clearly 
departure from its established dividend policy, and dividend reductions are more informative than dividend 
increases. 
7 
 
dividend reduction. The market reacts more negatively to interim dividend reductions than to 
final dividend reductions. Empirical results using a matched sample procedure indicate that 
abnormal changes in profitability are negative both during the year of dividend reductions as 
well as in the following year. Thus, our study provides evidence that dividend reductions in 
Australia signal a decrease in future profitability of the firm.  Furthermore, we do find a 
significant impact deriving from franking status on the signaling power of the dividend 
reductions and this effect manifests itself most strongly via the interaction between franking 
status and variables such as the dividend reduction size.   We also find that franking status has 
significant influence on the choice of the size of the reduction.   
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses hypothesis development, while 
Section 2 presents a discussion of our data and methods employed.  In section 3, we analyze the 
factors that determine the level of the dividend reduction.  In section 4, we examine the relation 
between dividend reductions and abnormal changes in profitability and provide empirical 
evidence regarding the market response to dividend reductions.  Finally, our conclusions are 
presented in Section 5. 
1.  Hypothesis development 
  
There are two aspects of an efficient signaling system with respect to dividend payments.  First, 
managers should reveal future prospects through changes in dividend payments.  Second, it is 
imperative that the stock market react to the dividend changes in a consistent manner.  In order to 
analyze the efficacy of signaling under the imputation system, we develop hypotheses related to 
both features of the signaling mechanism discussed above.   
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A signaling equilibrium will exist where the marginal benefits deriving from the signal 
are equal to the marginal costs of making that signal. One contributory factor to the signaling 
cost is the potential differential tax cost of making a dividend payment. With a tax imputation 
system this tax cost effect will be reduced or eliminated. Brown and Howard (1992) contend that 
the imputation system creates a bias towards high dividend payouts in Australia. Furthermore, 
Monkhouse (1993) derives a CAPM within an imputation system and shows that the optimal 
dividend policy is for a firm to distribute its imputation credits since they lose value over time. 
Thus, resident shareholders in Australia would prefer to receive fully imputed dividends as 
compared to other forms of distribution that include capital gains.  Fung and Theobald (1984) 
demonstrate in a time-state preference framework that a positive dividend equilibrium relative to 
gains will occur under a firm and stockholder credit imputation system when t(d) < t(g) (1-F) + 
F, where t(d) (t(g)) is the income (capital gains) tax rate for the investor and F the firm tax credit. 
That is, when F>= (t(d)-t(g))/(1-t(g)). Since the Australian tax code taxes capital gains at income 
tax rates this condition will be fulfilled for the Australian case, with non-zero F.4 That is, a 
dividend equilibrium will exist in Australia with the payment of franked dividends providing a 
tax viable strategy. As a consequence, dividend reductions will have greater power and impact, 
particularly in the case of franked dividends.  
The reduction of the tax cost associated with dividends will mean that dividend signaling 
will be more readily employed in Australia since lower marginal benefits will warrant signaling 
in this tax setting. Furthermore, since, in normal circumstances, dividends will figure within a tax 
induced time-state preference equilibrium, a reduction in dividends in Australia will provide a 
stronger signal than in non-imputation tax systems. Where, however, the dividend tax credit 
                                                 
4 If the stock has been held for at least 12 months, the maximum rate of capital gains tax for an individual will be 
half of their marginal tax rate on their ordinary income. 
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cannot be recovered against corporate tax liabilities, the marginal cost of dividends will increase 
leading to a tax induced rationale for the dividend reduction.5 
The dividend signaling hypothesis would predict that dividend changes are positively 
related to future earnings changes. The signaling efficacy of dividends has been found to be 
weak in the US, perhaps due to the declining propensity of firms to pay dividends and the 
existence of other motives to retain cash.6 However, as we argued previously there are major 
differences between the US and Australia with respect to a firm’s distribution policy that 
strengthen the preponderance, and therefore the signaling efficacy, of dividends in Australia. 
With this increase in the likelihood and signaling power of dividends we would anticipate a 
stronger articulation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings numbers.  Therefore, 
we have the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Under an imputation environment, dividend reductions will be followed by future 
declines in a firm’s profitability, other things being equal.      
Essentially, then, within an imputation system the linkage between dividends and 
profitability/earnings streams is made stronger. There is, however, a further underlying factor 
that drives this earnings/dividends linkage arising from the tax credit recovery being dependent 
upon taxable profits.  Following this line of argument it would be anticipated that the dividend 
reductions would be more likely to occur when a firm has insufficient franking credits to pass on 
to shareholders. On the other hand, there will be a strong reluctance on the part of managers of 
firms with sufficient franking credits to reduce dividends, since Australian resident shareholders 
                                                 
5 Although there will be an associated signalling effect regarding the strength of earnings not permitting tax credit 
recovery. 
6 Chetty and Saez (2005) find that firms responded to the 2003 U.S. dividend tax cut by initiating dividends or 
increasing dividend payout. The tax rate on equity income was reduced to 15% in the US in 2003, which equalizes 
the dividend tax rate (from 38.6% to 15%) and capital gain tax rate (from 20% to 15%) for individual investors 
which is a necessary condition for a positive dividend equilibrium in a classical tax system (see DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980)). 
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will prefer franked dividends in order to receive the imputation credit.  As a consequence, then, 
we have the following hypotheses:   
H2(a): Franked dividend reductions will provide stronger signals regarding future 
profitability than unfranked dividends. 
 H2(b):  The magnitude of the dividend reductions in year t will be smaller for firms that 
paid a  franked dividend in year t-1 than for the unfranked dividend case, other 
things being equal.  
There is a subtle difference between H2(a) and H2(b).  H2(a) relates to a stronger 
statistical association between dividend reductions and future profitability when firms have 
sufficient franking credits as compared to a situation when they lack franking credits. H2(b) is a 
direct test of managerial reluctance to cut dividends which, as a consequence, would deprive 
Australian resident shareholders of imputation credits.  Implied in this argument, is the incentive 
of managers to reduce dividends steeply when they do not have sufficient franking credits to pass 
on to shareholders.  They are incentivised to take a “big bath” during bad years and subsequently 
after the financial position of the firm recovers, continue the payment of dividends with franking 
credits.  
Our second set of hypotheses relates to the market reaction to dividend reduction 
announcements.  Since we argue that, under an imputation environment, dividend reductions 
constitute strong signals of future prospects, we expect stock price reactions to correspond to the 
size of dividend reductions.  Therefore, we have:     
H3:  The size of dividend reductions will be negatively related to price reactions. 
We have argued that signaling is stronger when firms posses sufficient franking credits to 
distribute than when they lack such credits, and, as a consequence, we have: 
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H4(a): The price reaction will be more strongly negative to reductions in franked than 
unfranked dividends, cet.par. 
We have argued previously that managers will be reluctant to reduce franked dividends 
and that the strength of the signaling impact will depend upon the magnitude of the dividend 
reduction. Consequently, there will be an interaction between franked status and dividend 
reduction size which will impact upon dividend signaling. For example, the combination of a 
large reduction in franked dividends will have a proportionately stronger signaling effect than for 
a reduction in unfranked dividends of the same size leading to 
  H4(b): The signaling power (both in terms of future profitability and price reactions) of 
a dividend reduction will derive from an interaction between the franking status 
of the dividend and the magnitude of the reduction. 
The franking status would include not only the franked versus unfranked status of the 
dividend but also the more general availability of the franking credit within the firm.  
Another aspect of the signaling hypothesis is the timing of dividend reductions.  Faced 
with declining future prospects, managers have the choice of reducing interim dividends versus 
postponing the reductions to final dividends.  We argue that interim dividend reductions 
constitute stronger signals of firm value changes as compared to final dividend changes. We base 
this argument on the quantity and quality of information that is available to both managers and 
outside investors. Extant research studies show that the impact of new information on stock 
prices depends on the magnitude of the surprise as well as the quantum of pre-disclosure 
information before the announcement of new information. During the period of announcement of 
interim dividends both managers and outside investors have incomplete information regarding 
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the profitability of the firm during the current year to date. However, managers have inside 
access to information that is not available to outsiders. Furthermore, when interim dividends are 
announced, outside investors have few competing sources of information regarding the future 
prospects of the firm.  Managers may choose to convey a signal based on their private 
information set via interim dividends.  By having just one opportunity (rather than three, as in the 
U.S.) to convey dividend related information prior to the final, the manager is able to concentrate 
the information content more strongly at the interim.   
On the other hand, when final dividends are announced, the information environment is 
finer since both the firm’s insiders and outsiders have access to additional information, such as 
audited financial statements.  There is also the potentiality of management deferring the 
announcement of bad information; thus, when an interim dividend is cut, the signal is interpreted 
as being the stronger (and unavoidable).  Furthermore, since there is more noise in the interim 
earnings number, the tax credit recovery position is less clear at that stage, with the result that the 
dividend reduction will derive more strongly from a signaling, rather than tax, perspective.  
Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
H4(c): Interim dividend reductions will produce a stronger price reaction as compared to 
final dividend reductions, other things being equal.      
2. Data and Methodology 
In this section we describe the sample selection procedure and distribution of dividend reductions; 
firms characteristics between interim and final dividend reductions; matching procedure to calculate 
abnormal changes in profitability for the year of the dividend reduction and for the year after; and 
abnormal return generation and test statistics.  
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2.1  Data and Sample Selection 
 
 Initial interim and final dividend reductions are identified for Australian companies, where 
there are no dividend reductions (either interim or final) during the two-year period immediately 
preceding the initial interim and final reductions for the period between January 1995 and 
December 2006 using the IRESS and Bloomberg databases.7 A dividend reduction is defined 
relative to the previous year's value, i.e. there is a reduction if the interim (final) dividend per share 
in year t is less than the interim (final) dividend per share paid in year t-1.8 We find 269 dividend 
reductions in total, 125 interim dividend reductions and 144 final dividend reductions. We find 
that 87 (96) firms paid fully franked dividends, 30 (38) firms paid unfranked dividends and 8 
(10) firms paid partially franked dividends during the year prior to the interim (final) dividend 
reductions. We consider only initial dividend reductions since they are likely to provide a 
stronger signal as opposed to subsequent reductions which may be anticipated and wherein the 
innovation in the dividend series will be much less.  
Insert Table 1 near here 
Panel A of Table 1 contains the distribution of our sample across the years classified into 
interim reductions, and final reductions.  The sample is not strongly dominated by any one year, 
although the first year of our sample frame, 1995, did contain by far the smallest sample size (at 
9 reductions, in total). In Panel B of Table 1, we present the industry classifications for interim 
and final dividend reductions. We find that two of the industry sectors, viz., Materials and 
Capital Goods account for over 30% of our sample of dividend reductions.  Diversified 
                                                 
7 We have excluded the dividend reduction events that are announced simultaneously with share buybacks or stock 
splits or seasoned equity offerings or merger or acquisition or convertible bond issues. 
8 This study focuses on initial interim and final dividend reductions. We do not examine final dividend reductions that 
follow an initial dividend reduction at the interim level since they are more likely to be expected.  
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financials, Food, Beverage and Tobacco, Real Estate and Retailing together account for about 
29% of the sample.  The other 41% of the sample is distributed across all other sectors.  
2.2  Firm Characteristics of Dividend Reducing Firms 
 Table 2 provides information on total assets, prior year profitability (annual net profits 
after tax standardised by total assets), changes in profitability during the year of dividend 
reduction (standardised annual net profits after tax in year t - standardised annual net profits after 
tax in year t-1), prior year standardised net operating cash flow, changes in net operating cash 
flow during the year of the dividend reduction, the riskiness of the firm measured as the standard 
error of the market model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day –260 to day –
61 for each dividend reduction announcement, ownership concentration (top 20 shareholders 
ownership and blockholders holding 5% or above), market capitalization, and the book to market 
ratio (a measure of growth and investment opportunities) for the firms that reduce their interim 
or final dividends.  
Insert Table 2 near here 
We find that the prior year profitability, as measured by NPAT/TAt-1, is lower for the 
interim reductions as compared to the final reductions sub-sample.  The median current period 
profitability is also significantly lower for firms that reduce interim dividends as compared to 
final dividend reducing firms.  Furthermore, the change in profitability, as depicted by 
NPAT/TAt, with  the change operator, is significantly more negative for interim dividend 
reducers as compared to final dividend reducers.  Taken together, these results indicate that firms 
which face lower profitability and steeper declines in profitability tend to prefer reductions in 
interim dividends rather than postpone the reductions to the final stage.  Another interesting fact 
that emerges is that the market value of interim dividend reducers is statistically significantly 
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lower than for final dividend reducers. The book-to-market ratio at the balance sheet date 
immediately prior to the year of dividend reduction is higher for interim dividend reducers than 
that of final dividend reducers. This finding plausibly implies that firms with higher growth 
opportunities (or lower tangible assets) tend to defer their dividend reductions to a future period. 
We do not find any significant difference in ownership concentration (top 20 shareholders 
ownership or blockholders holding 5% or above) between interim and final dividend reducers. 
Finally, we find that interim dividend reducers have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk as 
compared to final dividend reducers.  These findings denote that smaller and riskier firms (i.e. 
essentially lower quality firms) prefer to conserve cash by choosing to go for interim reductions 
instead of deferring their reductions to the final dividends. 
2.3 Abnormal Earnings, Signaling and Dividend reductions 
To examine the signaling power or information content of dividend reduction 
announcements, we investigate how the percentage of dividend reductions (interim and final) is 
related with abnormal changes in profitability for the financial year of the dividend reduction and 
the year after. We define abnormal changes in profitability as the paired difference in net profit 
after tax to total assets between dividend reduction firms and control firms selected using a 
matching procedure suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). We select control firms based on the 
following criteria in order of importance: earnings performance for the year immediately prior to 
the dividend reduction is between 90% and 110% of the sample firm, same sub industry 
classification, and book to market ratio is between 70% and 130% of the sample firm (BM). 
Details of the procedure employed to select control-sample firms are as follows: 
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Exhibit 
Number of Matches Matching Criteria 
Interim Final
Performance ± 10%, BM ± 30% and same industry sub 
classification -level 2 
 
53 
 
67
Performance ±10%, and same industry sub classification based on 
Global Industry Classification standard 24 industry groups  
22 28
Performance ±10%, BM ±30% and same industry sub 
classification-level 1 
 
17 
 
8
Performance ±10% and same industry classification based on 
Global Industry Classification standard 10 industry sectors  
1 5
Performance ±10% and BM ±30% 27 29
Performance ±10% 2 7
No matching 3 0
Total 125 144
2.4  Return generating processes and test statistics 
The market model (MM) is used to examine the daily abnormal returns around 
announcement dates. Model parameters are estimated using 200 observations, commencing 260 
days prior to the event, with the Australian All Ordinaries Share Index used as the market proxy. 
This study uses the t-test statistic (standardized residual test statistic) to report the significance 
levels of the price reaction. The daily returns are measured using logarithmic returns after the 
adjustment for dividends on ex-dates. The abnormal returns for announcement periods are 
generated for different events windows: - day -2 to day 2 (two days before to two days after the 
announcement), day -1 to day 1 (the day before to the day after the announcement), and day 0 to 
day 1. These event windows are used to control for leakages and for "after hours" 
announcements (which are particularly likely for announcements of bad news).  
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3.   Determinants of the size of the dividend reduction  
We conduct Tobit regressions using the percentage dividend reduction as the dependent variable 
to identify the factors that determine the dividend reduction size. The results are displayed in 
Table 3.  In Panel A, we display the results for the full sample.  The decline in future profitability 
measured as the matched difference in profitability between sample firms and control firms in 
year t+1, ANPAT/TAt+1, has a negative sign indicating that firms facing a steeper decline in 
future profitability tend to make deeper cuts in dividends, a result consistent with H1.9 We 
therefore provide strong support for the signaling hypothesis.  
Importantly, we find that the franking status of the dividend for the year immediately 
prior to the dividend reduction, as encapsulated in the PERFRANK (percentage of franking) 
variable, has a statistically significant impact upon the size of the dividend reduction.  That is, 
the higher the degree of franking prior to the dividend reduction, the lower the size of the 
dividend reduction, which is consistent with management’s reluctance to reduce dividends and 
H2(b).  Thus we have empirically established that franking status is associated with the dividend 
reduction decision as posited in section 1 and providing some justification for the usage of 
dividend reduction size and franking status interaction variables (as argued in H4(b)).   
Insert Table 3 near here 
We include a number of control variables such as previous year’s profitability, current 
year profitability, idiosyncratic risk, firm size, and book-to-market ratio. Prior year profitability, 
as measured by NPAT/TAt-1 has a negative coefficient, indicating that firms with lower prior 
year profitability tend to have larger dividend reductions, other things being equal.  The decline 
in current year profitability measured as the matched difference in profitability between sample 
                                                 
9 In the case of final dividend reduction the relation between dividend reduction and abnormal changes in 
profitability is significantly negative only when we use abnormal changes in profitability as the only regressor. 
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firms and control firms during the year of the dividend reduction (year t), ANPAT/TAt, also has 
a negative sign indicating that firms facing a steeper decline in profitability tend to make deeper 
cuts in dividends.  Idiosyncratic risk has a positive and highly significant coefficient in the 
regressions. Firms with high idiosyncratic risk tend to make steeper reductions in dividends other 
things being equal.   Finally the coefficient of LMV (logarithm of the market value of the firm) is 
negative, denoting that large firms tend to make lower reductions in dividends as compared to 
smaller firms, ceteris paribus. Panel B and C of Table 3 show the results for the sub-sample of 
interim and final dividend reductions respectively.  We find similar results for interim and final 
sub samples as for the total sample.10   However, we find that the interim dividend reduction is 
more strongly related, both in magnitude and significance, to the contemporaneous decline in 
earnings than the final dividend reduction.  The franking status has less significance for the 
interim which is consistent with tax effects having less impact here due to the tax recovery 
position being less clear at this stage due to greater noise in earnings numbers. 
Summing up, we find strong empirical evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis.  We 
find that the decline in future year profitability is significantly related to the level of dividend 
reductions, affirming the basic foundation of the signaling theory.  The franking status impacts 
upon the dividend change, with a plausibly greater impact at the final stage. As a consequence, 
the signaling impact of franking status is somewhat more subtle, manifesting itself via its 
interaction with the size of the dividend reduction.  Firms with higher risk and lower market 
capitalisation tend to cut dividends more steeply, implying that they are most vulnerable to 
downturns.   
                                                 
10 We also find that decision to reduce dividends at the interim level rather than delay to the final stage depends on 
prior year profitability and size of the firm.   
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4. Empirical Evidence of Signaling  
As discussed in section 1, we have two sets of hypotheses pertaining to signaling through 
dividends.  We provide evidence regarding the relation between changes in dividends and the 
dividend/earnings articulation in section 4.1 and focus on the stock market reaction in section 
4.2.    
4.1  Dividend reductions and abnormal changes in earnings  
 
We empirically examine the efficacy of signaling future earning changes via dividend reductions 
by using the control sample procedure outlined in section 2.3.  We compare the profitability of 
our sample firms (and each of the four sub-samples) with those of control firms.  Our results are 
reported in Table 4. 
4.1.1 Univariate results on abnormal change in profitability  
Panel A of Table 4 contains the profitability for the year of dividend reduction for sample firms 
and their matched control firms and abnormal changes in profitability for sample firms, for the 
total sample as well as interim and final dividend reductions.  For the overall sample, as well as 
samples based on interim and final reductions, we find that the performance, as denoted by 
NPAT/TAt-1 is similar for the dividend reduction sample and the control firms during the year 
prior to dividend reductions.  This demonstrates that the profitability of both the sample firms 
and control firms are similar in the year prior to the dividend reductions and the success of our 
matching procedures.     
Insert Table 4 near here 
 We next examine the difference in profitability between the sample and control firms, 
during the year of dividend reductions, denoted by ANPAT/TAt and the year after, denoted by 
ANPAT/TAt+1.  The average and median abnormal changes in profitability are negative in year 
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t and t+1 for the overall sample, as well as the interim and final dividend reductions sub-samples, 
indicating that dividend reducers experience earnings declines during the year of dividend 
reduction and the year after.  
  Our results differ from those of Nissim and Ziv (2001), and Lie (2005) who studied 
dividend reductions in the U.S.  They report no significant declines in future earnings of firms 
that reduce their dividends.  This difference is potentially due to our study focussing on the 
initial dividend reduction rather than all dividend reductions and/or due to the imputation tax 
system in Australia particularly in the case of franked dividends. We explore the impact of 
franking status on dividend signaling using cross sectional regression analyses in section 4.1.2.   
4.1.2 Franking status, abnormal changes in profitability and dividend reductions 
Further evidence regarding the association between dividend reductions and changes in 
future profitability is provided by regressing abnormal changes in profitability on percentage 
reductions in dividends for the total sample as well as for sub samples of interim, final, 
unfranked and franked dividend reductions.  The results, which are reported in Panel B of Table 
4, demonstrate that there is a strong statistical association between the level of the dividend 
reduction and the deterioration in future profitability.  This supports H1 outlined in section 1, 
which predicts that there should be an articulation between dividend declines and poor future 
profitability.11 The dummy variable DIOF (interim versus final reduction) does not have any 
significant impact on the earnings signaling power.12 The significance levels for the association 
between abnormal changes in future profitability and dividend reductions are stronger for 
reductions in franked dividends than for reductions in unfranked dividends for the total sample as 
                                                 
11 Similar results are obtained when we use current year (year t) abnormal changes in profitability as the dependent 
variable (not reported).   
12 We do, however, find an impact of DIOF in price reaction (see section 4.2.2). 
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well as for the interim and final reduction sub-samples, thereby providing some support for 
H2(a).   
The franked dividends are the tax–favored distribution method in Australia. Any franked 
dividend reductions are construed as bad news as hypothesised at H2(a).  Australian managers 
are more reluctant to reduce dividends as compared to their U.S. counterparts and this has 
rendered dividend reductions to be a stronger signaling device in Australia as compared to the 
U.S.  To examine further the impact of franking on the relation between abnormal changes in 
profitability and the dividend reduction, we introduce the franking status of the dividend for the 
period prior to the dividend reduction [percentage of franking of dividend (PERFRANK) as well 
as dummy variables DFD (an indicator variable for a franked dividend in year t-1) and DUFD,  
(an indicator for unfranked dividend in year t-1)], dummy variable DREDFRANKt-1 reflecting 
the reduction in the franking percentage in year t-1 relative to year  t-2,  the reduction in franking 
credit during the year of dividend reduction (RFC)13 and composite variables reflecting 
interactive effects between  franking status, reduction in franking credit and  the magnitude of 
the dividend reduction in the cross sectional regressions. The results are reported in panel C of 
Table 4 for both the total sample (models 1-9) and a subsample of reductions in franked 
dividends (models 10-15).  RFC is an important franking variable since, as can be seen from its 
definition, it incorporates both the reduction in the dividend and the change in degree of 
franking.    
                                                 
13 
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As can be seen in panel C of table 4, we do not find any significant impact for franking 
status in year t-1 (percentage of franking in models 1 and 2 or the dummy variable DUFD in 
model 3). We also further examine the impact of franking status by allowing different 
coefficients on the reduction in franked and unfranked dividends and report the results in model 
4.  The coefficients on franked/unfranked dividend reductions are both negative and significant. 
The coefficients are not significantly different between franked and unfranked dividend 
reductions (using a Wald test). We also examine the impact of the reduction in franking credit 
and its interaction with franking status in models 5 and 6, and the impact of the reduction in 
franking credit and its interaction with franking status and dividend reductions in models 7, 8 and 
9.  The interaction variable comprising the reduction in franking credit and the franked dividend 
dummy variable (that is RFC*DFD) is highly significantly negative (at the 1% level) whereas the 
unfranked dummy is significantly negative at the 5% level in models 5 and 6 and the franking 
credit reduction, franked dummy and reduction size interaction variable (that is 
RFC*DFD*DRED) is similarly highly significant at the 1% level whereas the unfranked dummy 
and reduction size interaction variable (that is DUFD*DRED) is significantly negative at the 5% 
level in models 8 and 9. We also examine the impact of RFC and its interaction with dividend 
reductions for the subsample of franked dividend reductions and find significant support for RFC 
in signaling reduction in profitability. Effectively, then, we have provided strong empirical 
support regarding the articulation between dividend franking status and abnormal changes in 
profitability as encapsulated in H1, H2(a) and H4(b). The results indicate that the interrelation 
between franking status and profitability is somewhat more complicated than a simple 
articulation, arising from the relationship being multifactorial and deriving from variable 
interactions as presented in Section 1.                 
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4.2  Market Reaction to Dividend Reductions 
As a final investigation of the signaling hypothesis, we examine stock market reactions to 
dividend reductions.  We analyze the stock market reaction using an event study methodology in 
section 4.2.1 and report results using cross-sectional regressions in section 4.2.   
4.2.1 Announcement effects 
Table 5 contains the results regarding the stock price reaction to dividend reductions.  We 
report mean and median abnormal returns and the standard residual t-tests (SRT) employing the 
market model to dividend reductions for the periods: two days before the announcement date to 
two days after (day-2 to day +2); the day before the announcement date to the day after (day-1 to 
day +1); the day of announcement and the day after (day 0 to day 1). The results from Table 5 
indicate that the 3-day mean CAR surrounding the announcement of all reductions is a highly 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) -3.14% indicating that dividend reductions do have 
strong price signaling power in Australia.  Interim dividend reductions induce a much stronger 
negative response of -4.35% as compared to -2.08% for final dividend reductions. Both results 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of price reaction is significantly more 
negative for interim dividend reductions than final dividend reductions at the 5% level.  The 
results reported for the other event windows such as (-2, +2), (0,+1) provide similar results, 
indicating that the results are not sensitive to the event window.  Interim dividend reductions are 
seen as bad news while final dividend reductions are viewed less negatively, but still bad news. 
This implies that the market is able to infer the deteriorating performance of firms that 
subsequently reduce interim dividends.  In the case of firms that reduce final dividends, the 
market holds a more benign, though still pessimistic, view regarding future prospects.  The 
empirical results indicate support for hypothesis H4(c).  
Insert Table 5 near here 
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4.2.2  Cross sectional analysis of price reaction 
In this section, we empirically test whether the magnitude of the stock price reaction varies 
directly with the level of dividend reductions via a cross sectional specification, after controlling for 
other variables that may influence the price reaction.  Importantly, we investigate the impacts of 
the franking status of dividends upon the magnitude of the price reaction, both in simple terms 
and via interaction effects as suggested by H4(b).  Since the results are robust to the event date 
window we use the abnormal return from day -1 to day 1 as the dependent variable in the cross-
sectional model. The set of explanatory variables and their anticipated signs (in parentheses) are: 
DRED (-) is the percentage reduction in dividend (both interim and final), deriving from H3; 
DIOF (+) equals 1 if the firm reduces its dividend at the interim level and zero if the firm reduces 
the dividend at the final level. The rationale for the inclusion of this explanatory variable derives 
from H4(c), that interim dividend reductions have stronger information content than final 
dividends. PERFRANK t-1 (-) is percentage of franking credit incorporated into the interim and final 
dividends for the year prior to the interim and final dividend reductions.  That is, the higher the 
franked percentage of dividends, the stronger the signaling power, deriving from H4(a). 
DREDFRANK t-1 (+) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reduces the percentage franking 
on a dividend paid in t-1 relative to t-2 and zero otherwise.  We expect a positive coefficient for this 
variable as the market will react less negatively for a dividend reduction event that had a reduction 
in franking for the period immediately prior to the dividend reduction corresponding with 
H4(a).DFD, DUFD and RFC are variables as previously defined.  A number of franking status 
interaction terms are included within the specifications corresponding with the predictions of H4(b). 
Insert Table 6 near here 
The results of the cross-sectional analyses are contained in Table 6.  The dividend reduction 
(DRED) variable has the expected sign and is statistically significant in all models, consistent with 
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H3. We take this as strong support for dividend signaling.  The dummy variable DIOF has the 
expected sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with our hypothesis 
H4(c), that an interim dividend reduction provides a greater “shock” as compared to final dividend 
reductions. We do not find any significant impact for franking status in year t-1 (in terms of the 
percentage of franking). We also further examine the impact of franking status by allowing 
different coefficients on reductions in franked and unfranked dividends and report the results in 
models 9 and 10.  The coefficients on franked/unfranked dividend reductions are both negative 
and significant. The coefficients are not significantly different as between franked and unfranked 
dividend reductions (using Wald test). Similarly, the interaction between the reduction in franking 
credit and franked status of the dividend (that is RFC*DFD) has a significant impact at the 5% level 
whereas DUFD is significant at the 5% level in model 11.  The multiple interaction variables (that is 
RFC*DFD*DRED) have more statistically significant impact, than DUFD*DRED in models 13-15.   
 The coefficient of BMt-1 is not significant indicating that investment / growth opportunities 
do not play a significant role in determining the stock price reactions.  PRECAR is negative and 
statistically significant, as expected, indicating that prior anticipation of bad news attenuates the 
price response at the announcement of dividend reductions. LMV, and the Gearing ratiot-1 are not 
statistically significant.  These results indicate that there is no difference in stock price response for 
large firms as compared to small firms and that leverage is not associated with the magnitude of the 
stock price response. 
 Summing up, the market reacts more negatively to dividend reductions when the percentage 
of cuts is larger, when interim rather than final dividends are reduced, and when reductions are 
anticipated (or leaked) prior to the actual announcements providing strong evidence in support of 
our signaling hypothesis.  Additionally, we provide evidence to support the notion that franking 
26 
 
status does impact upon the magnitude of the price reaction, and that this effect manifests itself via 
an interaction with the size of the reduction. 
 
5.0 Conclusion 
We have argued that dividend signaling is likely to have more prevalence and power in 
Australia due to its financial and fiscal systems.  Since dividends figure in a tax induced 
equilibrium a reduction in dividends will provide strong signals to the market, both in terms of 
price reactions and in terms of future profitability.  Reductions in franked dividends should 
provide the stronger signal.  In setting the dividend reduction level, such signaling type 
phenomena should determine the extent of the reduction. 
In this paper we examine the stock price reactions to dividend reductions made by 
Australian firms during the period 1995-2006 and find that reductions are associated with 
negative stock price reactions.  The reaction is an increasing function of the size of the reduction.  
When we incorporate the interactions between dividend reduction size and franking status we 
find a statistically significant franking impact upon price reactions.  Interim reductions produce 
stronger negative abnormal returns as compared to final dividend reductions.  Firms will reduce 
their dividends at the interim rather than delay to the final stage when they are in dire straits; the 
immediacy of the dividend reduction is likely responsible for the stronger market reaction. We 
also find that the magnitude of the dividend reduction depends on the riskiness of the firm 
(idiosyncratic risk), size of the firm, prior year profitability, abnormal changes in the profitability 
during the year of dividend reduction, abnormal changes in the profitability during the year after 
the dividend reduction and the proposition of franking credit incorporated into the dividend 
payment.  
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We examine whether dividend reductions signal future reductions in profitability by 
using a matched sample procedure.  We find that abnormal changes in profitability are negative 
both during the year of dividend reductions as well as in the following year and negatively 
related to the dividend reduction.  The significance level for the relation between abnormal 
change in profitability and dividend reductions is statistically significantly stronger for dividends 
with associated tax credits. However, the relation between dividend reduction and reduction in 
future profitability does not vary between interim and final reductions. That is, while the market 
perception/reaction is different as between the interim versus final dividend, the managerial 
signaling decision does not vary. 
Overall, our study shows conclusively that dividend reductions in Australia constitute a 
strong signal regarding the future prospects of the firm and, as such, our results are at variance 
with the results obtained in the U.S. We argue that the difference is due to differences in the 
taxation and the timing of dividends. That is, the greater reluctance to reduce franked dividends 
will cause such dividends to have greater signaling power.  This contention is supported in terms 
of signaling future earnings, market reactions and figures in the determination of the degree of 
dividend reduction either directly or via interacting with reduction size. Our principal 
contribution is to highlight the role played by institutional features in determining the efficacy of 
signaling devices in corporate finance and, as a consequence, our paper has implications for 
policy makers.   
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Table 1: Description of Dividend Reductions Sample 
Panel A - Dividend Reduction Year By Year Analysis 
Year Interim reductions Final  reductions Total 
1995 4 5 9 
1996 13 14 27 
1997 4 10 14 
1998 6 8 14 
1999 15 13 28 
2000 5 16 21 
2001 19 17 36 
2002 13 9 22 
2003 14 15 29 
2004 7 8 15 
2005 11 11 22 
2006 14 18 32 
Total 125 144 269 
Panel B : Dividend Reductions industry by industry analysis 
Industry Interim reductions Final reductions Total 
  Number %
Automobiles & Components - 2510 4 5 9 3.35 
Banks - 4010 5 1 6 2.23 
Capital Goods- 2010  13 22 35 13.01 
Commercial Services & Supplies -2020 6 11 17 6.32 
Consumer Durables & Apparel - 2520 5 6 11 4.09 
Consumer Services - 2530 1 4 5 1.86 
Diversified Financials- 4020 8 11 19 7.06 
Energy – 1010 4 2 6 2.23 
Food & Staples Retailing -3010  2 3 5 1.86 
Food Beverage & Tobacco – 3020 9 15 24 8.92 
Health Care Equipment & Services – 3510 2 5 7 2.60 
Insurance -4030 4 2 6 2.23 
Materials- 1510 28 18 46 17.10 
Media -2540 4 6 10 3.72 
Oil &Gas 1010 1 0 1 0.37 
Industrial Conglomerates - 2015 1 0 1 0.37 
Real Estate - 4040 5 12 17 6.32 
Retailing- 2550 9 9 18 6.69 
Software & Services -4510 4 3 7 2.60 
Technology Hardware & Equipment- 4520  5 1 6 2.23 
Telecommunication Services – 5010 0 1 1 0.37 
Transportation -2030 5 4 9 3.35 
Utilities -2040 0 3 3 1.12 
Total 125 144 269 100.00 
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Table 2: Some Basic Univariate Tests 
This table provides univariate statistics on firm characteristics for total sample, interim reductions and final reductions. This table also provides 
nonparametric Mann Whitney statistics for the difference in median between two sub groups: interim reductions and final reductions. NPATt/TAt 
: Net profit after tax in period t standardised by total assets in period t; NOCFt/TAt: Net operating cash flow in period t standardised by total 
assets in period t; 
: First difference operator; MV: Market value; BMt-1: Book/Market value ratio in period t-1; BH: Blockholders holding 5% or 
more of common stock at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the dividend reduction announcement;; Top20: the proportion of shares held by 
top 20 shareholders at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the dividend reduction announcement;  IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as 
the standard error of the market model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day –260 to day –61 for each dividend reduction 
announcement; and TA: total assets. *Significantly different from zero at 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at 5% level and *** 
significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
 Interim versus final dividend reductions 
  All Interim Reductions Final Reductions MW test 
Total Assets t-1 Mean    ($M) 1511.22 1404.56 1603.81  
 Median ($M) 105.19 92.44 112.23 1.33 
NPAT t-1 /TA t-1 Mean % 6.51 4.93 7.89  
 Median% 5.96 5.03 6.29 1.91* 
NPAT t /TA t Mean % 0.62 -1.33 2.32  
 Median% 3.40 2.41 3.81 2.82*** 
NOCF t-1/TA t-1 Mean % 7.73 7.55 7.88  
 Median% 7.59 6.75 7.80 0.43 
NOCF t/TA t Mean % 6.29 5.77 6.74  
 Median% 5.92 6.16 5.70 0.59 
NPAT/TA t Mean % -5.89 -6.25 -5.58  
 Median% -2.53 -3.29 -2.15 2.03** 
NOCF/TA t Mean % -1.44 -1.78 -1.14  
 Median% -1.40 -1.39 -1.43 0.19 
MV Mean  ($M) 910.54 682.08 1108.86  
 Median 80.16 54.69 105.18 2.26** 
BM t-1 Mean 0.89 0.92 0.86  
 Median 0.89 0.94 0.85 2.23** 
Top 20 Mean % 68.15 66.42 69.66  
 Median % 71.90 68.62 75.72 1.23 
BH Mean % 43.69 42.04 45.13  
 Median % 45.01 43.53 48.08 1.13 
IDYRISK Mean % 2.56 2.73 2.42  
 Median % 2.18 2.44 2.08 2.11** 
Sample Size  269 125 144  
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Table 4: Dividend reductions and abnormal changes in profitability 
Panel A of this table provides profitability as measured by NPAT/TA for the year prior to the interim/final dividend reductions for 
the sample of firms reduced their dividends and control firms who do not reduced their dividend. This panel also reports abnormal 
changes in profitability for the year of the dividend reductions and the year after, measured as difference in NPAT/TA between 
sample firms and control firms. Wilcoxon signed ranked test statistics (WSR) is also reported to test whether median abnormal 
changes in profitability is different from zero. Panel B provides regression results between abnormal changes in profitability in t+1 
and dividend reductions. Panel C provides the impact of franking status on the relation between abnormal changes in profitability 
in t+1 and dividend reductions. DRED: percentage dividend reduction; DIOF: equals 1 if the firm reduces its dividend at the interim 
stage and zero if the firm reduces the dividend at the final stage; DREDFRANK t-1:  is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm reduces 
percentage of franking credit on dividend in t-t relative to t-2 and zero otherwise, DFD is a dummy variable if the firm paid franking (full 
or partial) dividend in the year t-1 and zero for unfranked dividend in the year t-1, DUFD is a dummy variable if the firm paid unfranked 
dividend in the year t-1 and zero for franking (full or partial) dividend in the year t-1 and RFC is percentage of reduction in franking 
credit in year t at the interim (final) dividend reduction relative to interim (final) dividend in year t-1.White Heteroskedasticity-
Consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for Panel B. Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Panel A: profitability and abnormal changes in profitability  
  Sample Firms 
NPAT/TAt-1 
Control Firms 
NPAT/TAt-1 
ANPAT/TAt ANPAT/TAt+1 
All Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
WSR 
N 
6.51 
5.96 
(12.80)*** 
269 
6.40 
6.02 
(12.60)*** 
266 
-4.85 
-2.20 
(5.02)*** 
266
-4.22 
-2.47 
(6.62)*** 
255 
Interim 
Reductions 
Mean 
Median 
WSR 
N 
4.93 
5.03 
(8.08)*** 
125 
4.82 
5.21 
(7.98)*** 
122 
-5.83 
-2.72 
(4.92)*** 
122 
-3.69 
-2.31 
(2.97)*** 
114 
Final 
Reductions 
Mean 
Median 
WSR 
7.89 
6.29 
(9.99) *** 
144 
7.77 
6.56 
(9.80)*** 
144 
-4.05 
-1.54 
(4.40)*** 
144 
-4.48 
-2.58 
(4.08)*** 
141 
Panel B – Regression analysis: Abnormal changes in profitability in year t+1 (ANPAT/TAt+1) versus dividend reductions 
(dependent variable - ANPAT/TAt+1) 
 C DRED DIOF Adj R F statistic p-value N 
dividend reductions 
All 0.0092 
(0.78) 
-0.0948 
(-3.75)*** 
 0.0575 16.49 0.0001 255 
All 0.0026 
(0.20) 
-0.0994 
(-3.94) *** 
0.0202 
(1.25) 
0.0595 9.04 0.0002 255 
Interim 0.0231 
(1.27) 
-0.0998 
(-2.65)*** 
 0.0513 7.11 0.0088 114 
Final 0.0024 
(0.16) 
-0.0990 
(-2.91)*** 
 
 
0.0650 10.74 0.0013 141 
Reduction in unfranked Dividend 
All 0.0328 
(1.00) 
-0.1276 
(-2.41)** 
 0.0486 4.37 0.0404 67 
All 0.0176 
(0.52) 
-0.1353 
(-2.57) ** 
0.0474 
(1.11) 
0.0535 2.86 0.0644 67 
Interim 0.0725 
(1.20) 
-0.1453 
(-1.69)* 
 
 
0.0273 1.79 0.1925 29 
Final 0.0125 
(0.34) 
-0.1276 
(-1.94)* 
 
 
0.0578 3.27 0.0789 38 
Reduction in Franked Dividend 
All 0.0034 
(0.27) 
-0.0833 
(-2.90)*** 
 0.0518 11.22 0.0010 188 
All 0.0002 
(0.02) 
-0.0861 
(-2.99) *** 
0.0100 
(0.61) 
0.0485 
 
5.77 0.0037 188 
Interim 0.0143 
(0.79) 
-0.0935 
(-2.27) ** 
 0.0608 
 
6.43 0.0131 85 
Final -0.0027 
(-0.16) 
-0.0794 
(-1.98)** 
 0.0388 5.12 0.0258 103 
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Table 5: Price Reaction to Dividend reductions 
This table reports mean and median abnormal returns and the standard residual t-tests (SRT) employing the market model for dividend reduction 
for the periods: the day before the announcement date to day after (day-1 to day +1); the day of the announcement date to day after the 
announcement date (day 0 to day +1) and the two day before the announcement day to two days after the announcement date (day-2 to day+2) to 
all dividend reductions, interim dividend reductions and final dividend reductions. This table also provides parametric t-test statistics for the 
difference in mean abnormal returns between two sub groups: interim reductions and final reductions. , *Significantly different from zero at the 
10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level and *** significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Price reaction:  interim dividend reductions versus final dividend reductions 
  All  Interim 
Reductions 
Final 
Reductions 
t-test  
Mean (%) -3.14 -4.35 -2.08 2.39** 
Median (%) -1.37 -1.71 -1.08  
 
Day -1 to 
day +1 
SRT    (-20.84)***     (-19.43)***    (-10.38)***  
Mean (%) -2.76 -4.09 -1.59 2.60*** 
Median (%) -0.86 -1.35 -0.49  
 
Day 0 to day 
+1 SRT     (-17.80)***    (-18.35)***      (-7.23)***  
Mean (%) -3.36 -4.75 -2.15 2.41** 
Median (%) -1.33 -1.64 -0.82  
 
Day -2 to 
day +2 SRT     (-22.58)***     (-20.66)***     (-11.62)***  
Sample Size 269 125 144  
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